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Abstract: The United States spends $20 billion each year on farm subsidies. Farmers face
increased risk and income variation when their crop portfolio is less diversified. It’s possible for
farm subsidies to decrease diversification if they are focused on specific crops. Utilizing state level
subsidy and agricultural data from the Environmental Working Group, I estimate the effect of
farm subsidies on crop diversification. I expect to find that crop specific subsidies decrease crop
diversification, which prior research suggests may have negative consequences for farmers and
society, in general.
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Do Farm Subsidies Affect Crop Diversification?
I.

Introduction

The United States spends $20 billion each year on farm subsidies (Top Crops in the States We
Serve). Farmers face increased risk and income variation when their crop portfolio is less
diversified. Utilizing state level subsidy and agricultural data from the Environmental Working
Group, I estimated the effect of farm subsidies on crop diversification. I found that crop specific
subsidies have an impact on diversification. Some crop subsidies increase overall crop
diversification while others lead to less diversification. Research suggests that decreases in crop
diversification has negative consequences for farmers and society in general.
Crop diversification in this paper is defined as a variety of crops grown in one region or on one
farm. I look at diversity across species not within. This rarely discussed topic has a sizeable impact
on both farmers and agriculture policy makers. This paper contributes to literature attempting to
understand the effects of government subsidies on long-term agricultural outcomes. There is little
research done on this topic within the field of agriculture, and considering its substantial effects, it
is it is important to explore the relationship between subsidies and crop diversification.
In 1845, Ireland faced a widespread hardship known as the Irish Potato Famine. The
country had a large monocultural potato crop (Monoculture and the Irish Potato Famine: Cases of
Missing Genetic Variation). Within one year, a simple blight wiped out 40% of the potato crop
across the nation, leaving the citizens with few agricultural alternatives leading to cases of
starvation and financial ruin (Irish Potato).
This paper begins with a literature review examining past crop diversity research, and the
consequences of having less crop diversity. Section III looks at the economics theory behind the
question. Section IV explains the sources of the data, the basic model, and an explanation of each
variable. Section V details the results and the interpretation of the significant variables. Section VI
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describes limitations with my model and the various techniques used to address each issue.
Finally, Section VII reviews the findings and application of this study.

II.

Literature Review
There are many studies that examine the impact of subsidies on crop output, acreage, and

price changes. Wu and Adams found that insurance premiums affect the acreage planted and alter
cropping patterns ( 2001). Ye, Yokomatsu, and Okada found that farm output changes in response
to subsidized insurance premiums (2012). Babcock, Fabiosa, and Jacinto explore the impact of
ethanol subsides on corn prices (2011). However, none of these studies consider subsidies’ impact
on crop diversity.
Crop diversity in agriculture is essential, as D. M. Spratt emphasizes in his esteemed
research on biodiversity. Specifically he states, “Some undetermined level of biological diversity
is necessary to maintain ecological function and resilience” (1997). Crop diversification is a buffer
against blights, pest outbreaks, and natural events such as drought, oversaturation, and frost (Lin
2011). A decrease in crop diversity means an increase in the likelihood that crops will suffer from
blights similar to the one in Ireland. The difference between 1845 and today is that we have
modern insecticides to help overcome this weakness. Meehan and Gratton find a statistically
significant relationship between landscape simplification and the use of insecticide (2015). As
crop diversity decreases, the farmers increase their use of insecticides or vise versa. Without the
buffer of crop diversity, farmers are forced to use the controversial method of insecticides to
protect their crops.
Aguilar et al say, “Diverse cropping systems tend to increase farmers’ chances of
encountering favorable conditions while decreasing the probability of widespread crop failures”
(2015). He means that the risk is spread out across several different crops, which is beneficial
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because each crop has its own unique tolerance level for inclement weather (2015). Aguilar et al
found in their recent research based on long-term data collected in Ontario, Canada, that
“compared to simple corn/corn and corn/soybean cropping systems, more diverse systems that
included a small grain such as wheat, or under-seeding with a cover crop such as red clover,
produced more stable yields over a 31 year period” (2015). This research exemplifies the pattern
that crop diversity leads to a more consistent harvest. Despite the benefits of more diverse
cropping systems there is still a decline in crop species diversity (Gaudin 2015). More strikingly,
Aguilar et al found that crop species diversity in the United States was lower in 2012 than in 1978
(2015).
Bianchi, Booij, and Scharntke find that a decrease in crop biodiversity is from agricultural
intensification, which is the act of trying to produce more units per acres of land (2006). In
addition to agricultural intensification I found that federal crop subsidies also contribute to
decreases in diversification. Crop specific subsidies lower the growing cost of that crop, create
attractive profits, and incentivize farmers to convert more acreage into the production of that crop.
Price support subsidies guarantee farmer’s revenue allowing them to keep their prices high
regardless of market conditions, creating even better profit margins (Spratt 1997). Therefore, it
follows that crops with higher expected profit yields are planted more abundantly. In a market
with no price controls, the market would adjust to the equilibrium price and quantity. The quantity
demanded would be supplied at an equilibrium price. Instead, in the agricultural market price
support subsidies act as price controls, preventing the price from changing. This creates a price
floor and means quantity will rise until the USDA lowers the price level by reducing subsidies
(Thompson 1993).
Crops that receive subsidies are grown more abundantly than those that do not (USDA).
Crops with higher profit margins will replace those with lower profit yields. Wright and
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Wimberley (2013) found that the steep price of corn caused by ethanol subsidies led to more
grassland being converted into corn (Alan, Doraiswamy, and Hunt 2013). “The area planted in
corn increased from 4.7 million hectares in 2001 to 5.7 million hectares in 2007, which was
correlated with the market price for corn” (Alan, Doraiswamy, and Hunt 2013).
Stern, Doraiswamy, and Hunt find that crop prices are correlated with acres planted (2013).
It is not directly the price that causes corn be more widely planted but rather larger profit margins
created by subsidizing the crop.

III.

Economic Theory
Crop insurance subsidies create unintended consequences. They create a moral hazard

because taxpayers pay about 60% of the premium, meaning, “Over time most farmers can expect
to collect far more in payouts than they pay in premiums” (EWG). Farmers respond to these
incentives by behaving rationally in “planting crops on poor-quality land, cutting back on things
like pesticides and fertilizer that reduce the risk of crop losses and reducing the extent to which
they diversify their enterprises” (Smith, 2015). Smith points out that subsidies cause farmers to
practice riskier behavior by not diversifying their crops and not using as many protective measures
such as insecticides (2015).
The Peltzman effect is a behavioral economic theory that states, as safety measures
increase people tend to take more risks. This can be seen with the subsidized insurance premiums.
As the insurance safety net is increased, farmers react with riskier behavior by not diversifying
their crops since they know they will be covered and not suffer a large loss if a blight or other
event wipes out their entire crop.

IV.

Data and Methodology
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The data used for this research was collected from a State level panel of four primary sources.
The first source is the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service. The data set provides
detailed agriculture statistics from the county to the national level. Specifically from this data, I
used statewide panel data of individual crop prices and acres planted per year. My second source
was the Environmental Working Group’s (EWG) Farm Subsidy Database. This source provided
me with statewide panel data of the dollar value for subsidies paid toward the production of 16
different crops from 1995 to 2014. The data is organized by crop per year. I used the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) database for the climate variables in my
model. These variables, 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 and 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑈𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌, vary across
states and over time. My last primary data source was the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Producer
Price Index (PPI). I used the PPI data to adjust crop prices for inflation over time.
My data spans 20 years, 1995 to 2014. It includes 49 states (Hawaii was dropped because
it did not grow any of the 16 crops chosen for this paper). The 16 crops were chosen based on the
top subsidized and top produced field crops grown in the United States (Farm Bureau Financial).
Tobacco was dropped because no data was available for acres planted. Dropping tobacco reduced
the number of crops to 15. Following these drops, the number of observations in my sample fell
from 1,000 to 980. Instead of using the statewide crop price, I used average national price to
prevent problems occurring with states that did not grown any of that crop. The states that did not
grow the specific crop would have a price of zero which would cause an error in the relationship
between crop price and subsidies.
Using number of acres planted, I derived my dependent variable, Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI).
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑆𝑖2

Where n = number of crops grown in yeart and Si = crop’s market share

(1)
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The Herfindahl- Hirschman is a measurement used by the Department of Justice, Federal
Trade Commission, and state attorneys general to measure market concentration when evaluating
company mergers. HHI is not about the number of crops grown in the state but rather the
distribution of market share or in this case crop concentration. 10,000 is the maximum value. This
would mean that a state is monoculture and grows only one crop in that one state. The minimum
value is zero. This would mean that a state grows a little of almost every type of crop in the state.
“A merger potentially raises ‘significant competitive concerns’ if it produces an increase in the
HHI of more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market.” An HHI of less than 1,500 is
considered unconcentrated (Chin 2016).
I choose to use acres planted instead of acres harvested to capture the true intention of the
farmer’s planting decision. This helps to control for variation from external factors that might
cause a difference between acres planted and acres harvested. The variation would most likely
cause a downward bias on the true effect of subsidies on amount of crops grown.
To estimate the effect of crop specific subsidies on crop portfolio diversity, I use the
following empirical model that contains state fixed effects to control for invariant characteristics
between states and across time.
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +β1 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 +β2 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑃_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +β3 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 +β4 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑈𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ β5 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
HHI is the measure of crop market concentration, which comes from equation (1).
SUBSIDY is the dollar value of a subsidy paid toward a specific crop in year t. CROP_PRICE is
the real price received for a crop measured in dollars per lb., bushel, or cwt.
AVERAGE_TEMPERATURE is the absolute value of the temperature’s deviation from the mean.
This measurement is important because it measures the difference between the expected and actual
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temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. The absolute value equally weights the deviation since
temperatures colder or warmer than expected both have an impact on crop growth.
DROUGHT_SEVERITY is the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) value. This index reports
moisture level of the earth’s soil where zero is normal and -4 is extreme drought. Positive values
mean higher than normal levels of moisture in the soil. Too much moisture in the soil can have
equally adverse consequences on crop growth as drought does (Kanwar, Baker, Mukhtar 1998).
Therefore, I use the absolute value of the PDSI value to give equal weight to both drought and
over-saturation. STATE_FE are state fixed effects, and εit is the normally distributed error term.
Looking at the summary statistics, the largest crop subsidy was corn, with a mean of $107
million. Wheat, cotton, soybean, and rice were also very large with average subsidies of $40, $ 36,
$32, and $14 million. The smallest subsidies were Dry Peas, Oats, and Canola with averages of
$34, $50, and $494 thousand. Two negative subsidies are found in the summary statistics. These
two negative subsidy values come from 2003 South Dakota barley subsidies, and 2003 Delaware
sorghum subsidies. The subsidies are negative because premiums paid by the farmers to the
USDA risk management department were greater than the payout by the USDA for those specific
crops, in SD. and DE. in that year. Potatoes and Hay did not receive any subsidies. The mean HHI,
market share concentration measure, was 4,058.
Summary Statistics
Variable
State
Year
PDSI. Index
Temp Dev from mean°F
HHI
Barley_subsidy
Canola_subsidy
Corn_subsidy
Cotton_subsidy
Hay_subsidy

Mean
0
2004.5
1.6556
0.9833
4058.837
2,865,035
494,105
107,000,000
36,500,000
0

Std. Dev.
0
5.769226
1.3724
0.7614
1812.524
8,965,507
4,099,084
213,000,000
109,000,000
0

Min
0
1995
0
0
1276.81
-1,560,047
0
0
0
0

Max
0
2014
7.38
4.4
10000
89,700,000
64,000,000
1,940,000,000
1,190,000,000
0
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Dry Peas_subsidy
Oats_subsidy
Peanut_subsidy
Potato_subsidy
Rice_subsidy
Sorghum_subsidy
Soybean_subsidy
Sugar beet_Subsidy
Sunflower_ Subsidy
Wheat_subsidy
Barley_price
Canola_price
Corn_price
Cotton_price
Hay_price
Dry peas_price
Oats_price
Peanut_price
Potato_price
Rice_price
Sorghum_price
Soybean_price
Sugar beet_price
Sunflower-price
Wheat-price

V.

34,401
50,370
3,971,452
0
14,600,000
7,323,856
32,300,000
143,574
1,055,431
40,800,000
3.50
15.96
4.07
67.60
134.48
11.56
2.72
0.28
8.45
12.00
6.61
9.19
50.80
18.78
5.09

378,665
3,59,565
21,700,000
0
58,700,000
26,300,000
73,000,000
1,725,581
5,778,095
77,100,000
1.52
7.24
1.91
19.35
13.58
5.10
1.03
0.06
2.70
5.14
3.27
4.01
14.69
8.61
2.17

0
0
0
0
0
-6,928
0
0
0
1.95
0.00
2.13
33.82
81.51
0.00
1.42
0.20
5.07
4.78
3.14
4.75
33.67
7.99
2.46

6,249,410
6,666,593
491,000,000
0
677,000,000
252,000,000
756,000,000
34,400,000
79,600,000
683,000,000
6.69
30.87
8.74
107.82
143.34
20.26
4.66
0.43
13.24
20.82
14.80
17.61
85.44
36.03
9.32

Results
In this section, I report two sets of OLS crop diversification results: one with state level

fixed effects and one without. To address concerns of heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard
errors in both variations. The two results both have significant coefficients at the .05 type I error
level for subsidy and price variables. The largest difference is in the adjusted R-squared. OLS with
state level fixed effects has an adjusted R-squared of .965. Running the same model without state
fixed effects returns an R-squared value of .167. This shows that state level fixed effects explains a
large amount of variation in the model.
Linear regression with state fixed effects
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Number of obs =
980
F( 30, 901) =
4.27
Prob > F
= 0.0000
Adj R-squared = 0.9653
Root MSE
= 337.4000

Variable
Year
PDS Index
°F dev. From mean
Barley_subsidy
Canola_subsidy
Corn_subsidy
Cotton_subsidy
Hay_subsidy
Dry Peas_subsidy
Oats_subsidy
Peanut_subsidy
Potato_subsidy
Rice_subsidy
Sorghum_subsidy
Soybean_subsidy
Sugar beet_Subsidy
Sunflower_ Subsidy
Wheat_subsidy
Barley_price
Canola_price
Corn_price
Cotton_price
Hay_price
Dry peas_price
Oats_price
Peanut_price
Potato_price
Rice_price
Sorghum_price
Soybean_price
Sugar beet_price
Sunflower_price
Wheat_price

Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic p-value
95% Confident intervals
-2.007714
17.29983
-0.12
0.908
-35.96036
31.94493
7.263384
9.333012
0.78
0.437
-11.05359
25.58036
-3.39993
20.82481
-0.16
0.870
-44.27071
37.47085
0.00000145
3.60E-06
0.4
0.687
-5.61e-06
8.51e-06
-0.0000223**
0.0000109
-2.05
0.040
-.0000436 -9.85e-07
0.000000102
9.07E-08
-1.13
0.261
-2.80e-07
7.59e-08
0.000000289
1.80E-07
1.61
0.107
-6.29e-08
6.42e-07
0.0000354*
0.0000191
1.86
0.064
-2.00e-06
.0000728
-0.0000748**
0.0000239
-3.13
0.002
-.0001217 -.0000279
0.00000146**
5.08E-07
2.88
0.004
4.66e-07
2.46e-06
-.000000919***
2.38E-07
-3.87
0.000 -1.38e-06
-4.53e-07
0.00000105
8.80E-07
-0.23
0.822
-1.93e-06
1.53e-06
0.00000105***
2.68E-07
3.92
0.000
5.26e-07
1.58e-06
-0.00000373
3.27E-06
-1.14
0.255
-.0000102
2.69e-06
0.0000134**
6.26E-06
2.13
0.033
1.07e-06
.0000256
-0.00000125**
5.17E-07
-2.41
0.016
-2.26e-06 -2.33e-07
-34.95109
81.0801
-0.43
0.667
-194.0789
124.1767
-16.9263**
6.254845
-2.71
0.007
-29.20206 -4.650538
83.28706
200.8556
0.41
0.678
-310.9122
477.4864
3.506568
2.811706
1.25
0.213
-2.011688
9.024824
-2.892213
2.543935
-1.14
0.256
-7.884941
2.100514
8.099798
14.67588
0.55
0.581
-20.7031
36.9027
-58.91206**
20.95636
-2.81
0.005
100.041 -17.78309
-793.4014
751.9775
-1.06
0.292
-2269.233
682.43
-36.22911*
20.12677
-1.8
0.072
-75.72992
3.271696
22.88003**
9.53074
2.4
0.017
4.174996
41.58507
-19.44942
67.7826
-0.29
0.774
-152.4796
113.5807
-24.61833
6.160654
0.47
0.639
-96.00346
46.7668
2.887553
6.160654
0.47
0.639
-9.20335
14.97846
-33.20325
20.64353
-1.61
0.108
-73.71831
7.311821
40.10713
88.00783
0.46
0.649
-132.6171
212.8313
*** significant at .01
Linear regression without State Fixed Effects
Number of obs = 980
F( 31, 948) = 10.21
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Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1669
Root MSE = 1681.2

Variable
Year
PDS Index
°F Dev. from mean
Barley_subsidy
Canola_subsidy
Corn_subsidy
Cotton_subsidy
Hay_subsidy
Dry Peas_subsidy
Oats_subsidy
Peanut_subsidy
Potato_subsidy
Rice_subsidy
Sorghum_subsidy
Soybean_subsidy
Sugar beet_Subsidy
Sunflower_ Subsidy
Wheat_subsidy
Barley_price
Canola_price
Corn_price
Cotton_price
Hay_price
Dry peas_price
Oats_price
Peanut_price
Potato_price
Rice_price
Sorghum_price
Soybean_price
Sugar beet_price
Sunflower_price
Wheat_price
_cons

Coefficient
Standard Error t-Statistic P value
95% Confidence interval
32.1611
90.74127
0.35
0.723
-145.9159 210.2381
180.0447***
28.89858
6.23
0.000
123.3321 236.7573
96.12742**
56.63974
1.7
0.005
-15.02634 207.2812
-0.0000101
8.87E-06
-1.14
0.256
-.0000275 7.33e-06
0.0000272*
0.0000162
1.68
0.094
-4.59e-06 .0000589
2.69E-07
2.48E-07
1.08
0.279
-2.19e-07 7.57e-07
-2.31E-06***
5.70E-07
-4.04
0.000 0.00000342 -0.00000119
0.0004676*
0.0000773
6.05
0.000
.0003159 .0006194
-8.72E-06**
0.0000799
-0.11
0.913
-.0001655 .0001481
-5.66E-06**
2.41E-06
-2.35
0.019
-.0000104 -9.35e-07
-5.29E-06***
9.13E-07
-5.79
0.000
-7.08e-06 -3.50e-06
-9.81E-06***
2.70E-06
-3.64
0.000
-.0000151 -4.51e-06
-2.36E-06**
8.24E-07
-2.87
0.004
-3.98e-06 -7.45e-07
-0.0000688***
0.0000156
-4.41
0.000
-.0000995 -.0000382
-0.000083***
0.0000156
-7.25
0.000
-.0001055 -.0000605
4.44E-06**
1.41E-06
3.16
0.002
1.68e-06 7.20e-06
-206.7345
439.9257
-0.47
0.639
-1070.075 656.6061
-72.50976***
20.10843
-3.61
0.000
-2813.377 2301.908
-255.7346
1303.278
-0.2
0.844
-2813.377 2301.908
-3.04271
14.84754
-0.2
0.838
-32.18055 26.09513
4.48319
16.25074
0.28
0.783
-27.40839 36.37477
97.69435
80.74782
1.21
0.227
-60.77079 256.1595
32.66686
118.3994
0.28
0.783
-199.6884 265.0221
3237.101
4013.233
0.81
0.42
-4638.747 11112.95
9.871267*
167.8436
0.06
0.953
-319.5167 339.2593
-90.47202*
49.31765
-1.83
0.067
-187.2564 6.312364
58.84689
396.5533
0.15
0.882
-719.3769 837.0706
25.40146
198.7345
0.13
0.898
-364.6089 415.4118
18.96123
51.03113
0.37
0.71
-81.18581 119.1083
-83.07931
88.97438
-0.93
0.351
-257.6888
91.5302
506.5073
765.2419
6.23
0.508
-995.2566 2008.271
-61420.62
179086
-0.34
0.732
-412871.4 290030.2
*** significant at .01 level
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The rice and soybean subsidies were the most significant of my key variables. They are
both significant at the .01 type I error level. The coefficient for rice is -9.19e-07. This means that
for every dollar spent on rice specific subsidies HHI will decrease by –9.19e-07 which is an
increase in the diversification of crops. The magnitude of this decrease is seen by multiplying the
coefficient by the average rice subsidy. The average rice subsidy is $14.6 million. Therefore rice
subsidies increases diversification by 13.4 HHI. This is a .3 percentage point increase in crop
diversification. Canola, oats, and wheat subsidies also have negative coefficients and are all
significant at the .o5 level.
Soybeans, peanuts and, sunflowers are significant at the .o5 level and have positive
coefficients meaning, that an increase in those subsidies decrease crop diversification. Soybean
was the most significant and had the largest magnitude with a coefficient of 1.05e-6, and a mean
subsidy of $32 million. The impact of soybean subsidies is an increase of 33.9 HHI which is a .84
percentage point increase in crop diversification.
The real price variables for canola, oats, potatoes, and rice are statistically significant.
These first three have negative coefficients, meaning that a $1 increase in the price of these crops
decreases HHI. The decrease in HHI means an increase in crop diversification. For example, a $1
increase in canola per cwt. will decrease HHI by 16.9points. In contrast to the first three crops the
coefficient of rice is positive; therefore, an increase in price of rice leads to an increase in HHI,
decreasing the diversification of crops planted.
Not all crop subsidies have the same result. An increase in a subsidy for one crop may increase
variety while an increase in another will reduce variety. In order to understand why subsidies
either increase or decrease crop diversification, consider the impact soybeans, wheat, and corn
have on crop diversification in the Corn Belt. Because these three crops are grown in the same
region and the same type of soil, they provide a simplified context to understand this concept.
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As one of the top two abundant crops, soybean subsidies will decrease diversification.
Increasing soybean subsidies means less wheat and more soybean acres planted. Soybean_subsidy
has a positive coefficient signaling a decrease in crop diversification. Although wheat is the third
most grown crop in the United States, increasing wheat subsidies actually increases diversification
because farmers replace the most abundantly grown crops, corn and soybean, with wheat (USDA
2016). The decrease is shown in the negative coefficient of wheat_subsidy. While both soybean
and wheat are widely grown in the Corn Belt, when subsidized, the two crops have opposite
effects on diversification.

VI.

Limitations
Corn was not significant in this model, most likely due to other forms of subsidies

indirectly paid to farmers through energy mandates and tax breaks. These imitation subsidies are
not captured in my model. The Renewable Fuel Standard mandate is a government-funded
program that incentivizes the production of corn by providing tax credits to petroleum companies
that blend ethanol with their fuel (Renewable Fuels Association 2016). These tax incentives,
adopted in 2007, provide farmers approximately $10 million per year (Bryce 2016). Lark,
Salamon, and Gibbs (2015) found that The Renewable Fuel Standard has a significant impact on
the displacement of existing crop for corn production. In a later draft of this paper, I will include
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the annual $10 million in my model, which I believe will strengthen the correlation between corn
subsidy and HHI, causing the coefficient of corn-subsidy to be significant.
I was unable to find data on farm productivity. One concern is that the omission of
productivity as a variable in my model causes bias. In an effort to minimize this possible bias
along with the bias caused by other immeasurable and invariable characteristics between states, I
included state fixed effects in my model. This inclusion pushed the climate variable coefficients
down. Drought severity index, which is not statistically significant with state fixed effects, is
significant at the .01 type I error level in the model without state level fixed effects.
Measurement error of subsidies is another concern. My measure of crop subsidies includes
both specific (direct) and non-specific (indirect) subsidies. A specific subsidy is a payment to a
farmer to grow a certain crop. A non-specific subsidy is a payment to farmers regardless of what
type of crop they plant. The problem is that while the inclusion of non-specific subsidies causes
measurement error, the data I used made it is impossible to separate them from specific subsidies.
For example, subsidized insurance premiums are non-specific and, therefore, do not depend on the
type of crop planted. The independent relationship between the type of crop planted and the
subsidized insurance premiums causes a noisy measurement and a downward bias on the
coefficient for subsidies. Available aggregate data shows that subsidized insurance premiums can
range from 3.5% (sorghum) to 73% (soybean) of subsidy payments depending on the crop.
Knowing that this measurement error exists, subsidy effects found to be significant are likely more
significant than they actually appear to be.
My model does not include a variable for the distribution of subsidies. Approximately 1015% of farmers receive 85% of all farm subsidies (Smith and Goodman 2015). With this
information comes the concern that the impact of subsidies on crop diversification would be
immeasurably small. However, large farms account for 66% of output, due mostly to economies of
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scale. Using this knowledge and the knowledge that large farms receive 74% of all subsidies, it is
safe to assume that the effect of subsidies on crop diversification will be measurable (Koba 2014).
Having an independent price variable and a quantity measure as a dependent variable
causes simultaneity. To address this issue, I used a market concentration measure for my
dependent variable instead of a direct measure of quantity. Some simultaneity still exists, but it is
not as significant as if I used a direct quantity measure.
One final concern is the existence of negative multicollinearity between subsidy and crop
price. An increase in subsidies for a particular crop will decrease the price of that crop and viseversa. Many subsidies are triggered when a crop price falls below a certain threshold (Edwards
2016). I compared the correlation between the two variables for each crop. I found only slight
correlation between each pair with the highest being .0992 between cotton subsidy and cotton
price. Subsidy is my key variable, so I am unable drop it. If the correlation was strong enough, I
would drop the price variable.

VI.

Conclusion

Crop specific subsidies significantly affect crop diversification. Farmers respond to the
incentive of lower growing costs by replacing existing crops with the subsidized crops. Less
diverse cropping systems and farm portfolios increase the probability of suffering from adverse
consequences such as crop failure, blights, pests, frost, drought, and oversaturation.
An increase in the HHI of more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market raises
significant concerns about market concentration (Chin 2016). Over the 20 year span of my data,
crop specific subsidies have increased HHI an average of 16.79 points. Wheat had the largest
impact, decreasing HHI by 51points. Even with the limitations of noisy measurement error and the
distribution of subsidies, the results are large in magnitude. With the ability to tease out this bias,
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the results recorded would carry even greater significance. When considering introducing,
increasing, or decreasing subsidies, agriculture policy makers need to first consider the impact on
diversification.
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